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In the community property system, which prevails in eight western
and southern states, there are two kinds of property, separate and com-
munity. Separate property is such property as was possessed at the
time of marriage by either spouse or is acquired thereafter by gift,
bequest, devise, or descent. Community property is such property as
is acquired after marriage which comes from other sources than those
just mentioned (omitting a statement regarding the income from
separate property).
Naturally the earnings of the spouses constitute the chief source of
acquisition of community property, whether the spouse is employed in
the service of another for a reward or whether he (or she) operates his
own business, or applies his skill and ingenuity in whatever manner, in
the creation of wealth. It is conceived that the wife in her way, con-
tributes not necessarily to the wealth, but at least to the well-being of the
marital community so that the price of a picture received by a great
artist would be as much community as the wages of a day laborer even
though the wife may make no contribution thereto. The income from
all industry and skill arises presumably from joint efforts and was
known in the Spanish law as the matrimonial gains or bienes ganan-
ciales.
In all the community property states save California, the beneficial
interests of the spouses in their acquisitions are equal, and the system
thus affords a means of accomplishing the proprietary equality of the
spouses such as the common law with the aid of legislatures has not
been able to achieve. On divorce the property is under normal circum-
stances divided equally, and in most states each spouse has capacity
equal to that of the other to inherit or dispose of it by will or pass it on
by descent. In California1 proprietary equality is not the primary aim
of the law. The husband owns the community property and the wife
never acquires a vested interest therein unless she survives the husband
or is divorced.
Although community property is acquired chiefly from the industry
of the spouses there are, nevertheless, certain sources of acquisition
which we may call secondary such as adverse possession, fixtures or
improvements, proceeds of life insurance policies, and damages
'See article by the writer, The Ownership of Community Property (1921) 35
HARv. L. REv. 47. The Acquisition of Public Lands is discussed in (1921) 9
CALI . L. REV. 267.
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recovered for personal injuries. The first two sources are discussed in
this paper.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
Title to land cannot be acquired against the government'by adverse
possession.2  What has been called a preference, however, may be
acquired by "squatting" on public land; such preference should be
carefully distinguished from an initiated title.3 Land acquired by the
adverse possession of husband and wife is acquired by onerous title and
becomes community.4
If an adverse possessor, prior to the running of the statute, has some
sort of interest as against the true owner, so that a title is initiated by
taking pbssession, then it would seem that the question whether such
property, to which title is subsequently perfected by the running of the
statute, is community or not, would depend on the question of fact
whether or not the adverse possessor was married at the time of taking
possession. If no title is then initiated, as against the true owner, the
property becomes community if he is married at the time the period of
limitation is completed, otherwise not.
Dean Ames said :5
"True property or ownership consists of possession coupled with
the unlimited right of possession, and when one person is dispossessed
*Lapique v. Morrison (1915) 29 Calif. App. 136, 154 Pac. 881; Tiffany, Real
Property (I92O ed.) sec. 51o; 35 L. R. A. (N. s.) 729, 747, note. For cases on
wrongful occupation of public lands, see cases cited in (1921) 9 CAnxr. L. REv.
267, 269, note I3; see also Votaw v. Pettigrew (1896) 15 Tex. Civ. App. 87, 38
S. W. 215; Figures v. Gregg (1897, Tex. Civ. App.) 39 S. W. 1oi1; Webb v.
Webb (855) I5 Tex. 275; Hall v. Hall (9o5) 41 Wash. I86, 83 Pac. 1O8. In
Evans v. Krowtinger (19o3) 9 Idaho, 353, 72 Pac. 882, the question is raised but
not decided, whether a ferry franchise can be acquired by prescription against the
state.
'It is difficult to understand Mr. McKay's criticism of the case of Carratt v.
Carratt (1903) 32 Wash. 517, 73 Pac. 483. During the marriage the husband
had received a deed from a grantee of the Northern Pacific Railroad purporting
to convey him certain lands which had been granted the railroad by Congress.
Under a subsequent forfeiture act the lands weri restored to the public domain,
but a preference was given to the actual possessors to purchase from the govern-
ment The forfeiture occurred after the death of the wife and the husband
thereafter exercised his preference and purchased the land. It was held that this
was not community property of himself and his deceased wife. This is clearly
right as no title had vested prior to her death and there was a mere preference
or option to purchase created by the statute. See McKay, Community Property,
sec. 23.
" Villescas v. Arizona Copper Co. (i919) 2o Ariz. 268, 179 Pac. 963; Hurley v.
Lockett (I888) 72 Tex. 262, 12 S. W. 212; Brown v. Foster Lumber Co. (915,
Tex. Civ. App.) 178 S. W. 787; Mitchell v. Schofield (I911, Tex. Civ. App.) 14o
S. W. 254; Adels v. Joseph (1912, Tex. Civ. App.) 148 S. W. 1154.
'See The Disseisin of Chattels (89o) 3 HARv. L. REv. 313, 318; Lectures on
Legal History (1913) 193, 198.
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by another, only the right of possession remains in the former, and thedispossessor has complete ownership except for the outstanding right
of possession. When the limitation period has run, the statute for-
bidding the exercise of the right, 'virtually annihilates it, and the imper-
fect title thereupon becomes perfect."6
But the original owner is not divested of his interest until the statute
has completely run. Livery of seisin required possession, but feoff-
ments are now wholly obsolete.
The necessity of possession to enable the owner to enfeoff and the
idea that sound public policy prevented the sale of lawsuits became
combined and established the rule that one whose land was in the adverse
possession of another could not convey it. The earliest statute directly
affecting the matter was "The Bill of Bracery and Buying of Titles,"
known as the Pretended Title Act.7
Adverse possession, the holding without right by one person of the
land of another, may arise under various circumstances, and depending
on the nature of those circumstances, was called disseisin, or abatement,
or intrusion, or discontinuance, or deforcement. The distinction
between disseisin and the other forms of wrongful holding has become
obsolete and we no longer distinguish even between disseisin, where the
possessor knows himself to be on another's land, and that adverse
possession which will give title under the statute of limitations."
The significance of seisin and disseisin in the early common law
before the Statute of Uses, the rout of seisin, the survivals of it, and
the statutory elimination of those survivals from i8oo to 1877, are
pointed out in two scholarly articles by Professor Percy Bordwell.9
These statutes deprived seisin of its theoretical as well as of its practical
importance in all cases except two.
"It lost its significance as a special kind of possession and ceased to
have any but historical significance save in a few exceptional
cases.10 . . . . It indicated the having of an estate or interest rather
than possession. In representations of title it came to be used .... to
indicate not posesssion .... but .... ownership.' 1
The identification of seisin with ownership made in a statement before
the Exchequer Chamber by Preston in Goodwright v. Forester,12 was not
common law but Preston, says Professor Bordwell.'13
'But see Brown v. Foster Co., supra note 4; Sanvage v. Wauhop (1912, Tex.
Civ. App.) 143 S. W. 259; Wingard v. Wingard (199o) 56 Wash. 289, lO5 Pac.
634; Bishop v. Lusk (1894) 8 Tex. Civ. App. 3o, 27 S. W. 306; Johnson v.
Johnson (1858) II Calif. 20o; Pancoast v. Pancoast (1881) 57 Calif. 320.
' (1540) 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9, sec. 2. See 32 L. R. A. (N. s.) 729, 73o, 'note.
'See Costigan, Conveyance of Lands by One Whose Lands Are in The Adverse
Possession of Another (19o6) ig HARV. L. REv. 267.9 Seisin and Dissesin (1921) 34 HARV. L. REv. 592 and 717.
'Ibid. 6o3. 'Ibid. 6o4.
(I8og, Exch. Ch.) i Taunt 578.
Bordwell, op. cit. 623, 624.
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"As soon as there was an operative statute of limitations, however,
the essentially provisional nature of the possessory right until the
running of the statute must have been mamfest and any doctrine of
defeasible title an anomaly..... .. This failure to distinguish the new
adverse possession- from the old disseisin is a story in itself.. .. "
Professor Bordwell points out that in only three states, New York,
North Carolina, and Maryland, has' the rule seisina facit stipitem ever
had anything like its English place in our law and that descent is traced
not from the last one seized but from the last one entitled ;14 that in
twenty-six states, lands in the adverse possession, of another have been
alienable from the first (including all the community property states
save Arizona and Washington where the matter has not been dealt with
by legislatures or courts) and are now alienable in all but seven states;
and that where the non-transferability of land in the adverse possession
of another has been a rule of property, the accustomed explanation of
it has been the avoidance of maintenance and champerty.'
5
The possession adversely of privately owned land does not differ from
the unlawful possession of public land save that in the latter case it
cannot alone ripen into title. Where a statute gives the preference to
such occupant, to acquire in the lawfully appointed way, it is conceived
that his possession is quite like that of the former, there being a differ-
ence only in the conditions precedent to the acquisition of title. The
interest of an adverse possessor therefore is more nearly comparable to
what is sometimes termed an estate on a condition precedent than to one
held on a condition subsequent, the former being really no estate at all.'
8
"There is actually no estate at all so long as the condition precedent
exists as such, but merely the prospect or possibility of an estate."
The title which the adverse possessor acquires is not transferred to him
from the former owner, but is an entirely new title and so is freed from
the covenants for title which bound the former owner.'
7
14 Ibid. 730, 731.
15Ibid. 735, 736. Professor Henry W. Ballantine seems to have a somewhat
different view although he recognizes the point which this paper attempts to make.
"As Gibson, C. J., puts it, 'The instant of conception is the instant of birth,'
without any period of gestation or maturing of an inchoate title. The idea seems
to be that the statute of limitations is a conveyancer like the Statute of Uses,
which, when there is a deed by Doe to the use of Roe and his heirs, 'executes the
use,' and
"'Like a flash of electricity,
The land's transferred in fee to Roe,
Nothing at all remains in Doe."'
-Title by Adverse Possession (1918) 32 HARv. L.
Rav. 135, 144.
This is believed to be about the situation save that the title of the true owner
does not go to the adverse possessor. See also editorial notes in (9o7) 2o HARv.
L. REV. 563; (i9o8) 21 HARv. L. REV. 363; (io9) 22 HARv. L. Rav. 168; (1904)
2 MIcH. L. R v. 314.
"i Tiffany, Real Property (192o ed.) sec. 75.
172 ibid. sec. 511.
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Prior to the running of the statute the adverse possessor may validly
transfer whatever interest he has by parol ;18 he has no interest which
the true owner must respect nor one protected by law, save as to third
persons.
It seems clear then that the adverse possessor is a mere occupant and
has no vested interest until the running of the statute, and the decisions
in the community property states, though not numerous, save in Texas,
so hold. If there is a community when the statutory period is completed
the land is community, otherwise not.19 The nature of the possession
claimed to be adverse, begun by a woman who later marries, may be
evidenced by subsequent admissions of the husband and she is bound
by such admissions because the possession if adverse would have inured
to the benefit of the community.20
Does adverse possession under color of title make a difference?
Color of title is defined by Tiffany as "the takihg possession by one
who has, in taking possession, acted on the strength of a conveyance orjudicial decree purporting to vest the title in him, but which for some
reason, fails to do so. '21 Of course if the color of title is such title,
though defective, that it could be protected and, relying on which, title
could be quieted 22 or the cloud removed, the significant date for the
determination of the nature of the property would be the date of the
beginning of adverse possession. One does not have an initiated title
where the title he has is not protected against all the world. An adverse
possessor is like an option-holder prior to the exercise of the option, in
that he has no title, till the contingency happens which vests title. Prior
to that neither is an equitable owner.
In Gafford v. Foster,21 it was held that possession under a tax deed
did not vest a title and though such deed is sufficient as color of title to
support an adverse possession under the five year statute,24 still as the
wife died before the title was registered, a community interest did not
arise and would not have arisen if the registry had taken place before
her death. In Texas a tax deed conveys a defeasible title or estate.25
"s See note in 2 Corpus Juris, 256.
9 Mr. McKay strongly insists that a disseisor or adverse possessor has a title
and that the question whether land is community or separate is to be determined
by the fact whether or not there was a marriage existing when the adverse posses-
sion was begun. The writer has attempted to point out the impropriety of this
view as a modern doctrine and especially in all the community property states
where the true owner has never been unable to transfer freely his land in the
adverse possession of another. See McKay, op. cit. chap. VI.
Texas & N. 0. Ry. v. Speights (19O1) 94 Tex. 350, 6o S. W. 659.
'2 Tiffany, op. cit. secs. 500, 512. Defective title seems to be more than
color of title. See also Ballantine, Claim of Title by Adverse Possession (1919)
28 YALE LAW JOURxAL, 219; Collins v. Lynch (1893) 157 Pa. 246, 27 At. 721.
See 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (2d ed. iig) secs. 2157-2165.
(904) 36 Tex. Civ. App. 56, 81 S. W. 63.4 Vernon's Sayles' Texas Civ. Sts. 1914, art. 5674 (old art. 3342).
'Ibid. art. 7677 (old art. 5225).
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No defect in the tax deed is indicated in the Gafford case so it is difficult
to see why the community interest did not vest. The court cites various
cases where a mere preference has been acquired in public lands and a
failure to note the distinction between this mere preference and an
initiated title may account for the result.
In Duncan v. Bickford,2 the husband by purchase at an adminis-
trator's sale, became the-grantee in a void deed and so did not have color
of title and no community interest vested thereby.
In Siddall v. Haight,27 an attorney was being sued for damages for
neglect of professional duty in failing to cause execution to be" levied
against certain property, alleged to be the community property of one
Thompson and his wife. If the property should prove to be the
separate property of the wife then the action could not be maintained.
The sister of Mrs. Thompson had made a parol gift of the land to the
latter by virtue of which she with her husband entered and occupied the
land. After the sister's death the latter's administrator brought an
action of ejectment against Mrs. Thompson, not joining the husband.
Judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant, the court finding that
Mrs. Thompson had acquired title by adverse possession. The record
of that judgment was offered and admitted as evidence in the Siddall
case. The former judgment could not be binding on Thompson and
his privies being a res inter alios acta. The plaintiff made the point that
land acquired by the adverse possession of husbaid and wife must be
community property but the court held that the adverse possession ori-
ginated in a verbal gift to the wife, thus in effect holding that some title
was initiated in her. A verbal gift followed by possession and valuable
improvements would be a defence against ejectment,28 but that was not
this case. A parol gift of land alone does not give color of title29 nor
(1892) 83 Tex. 322, 18 S. W. 598.
S(190I) 132 Calif. 32o, 64 Pac. 410; cf. Bullock v. Sprowls (1899, Tex. Civ.
App.) 54 S. W. 157; 18 Am. St Rep. 113, note.
' Seavey v. Drake (1882) 62 N. H. 393.
"Allen v. Mansfield (892) .IO8 Mo. 343, i8 S. W. 901. See NoTEs (igog) 23
HARV. L. R~v. 56; (1912) 21 YALE LAw JouR AL, 618; (1913) 1 C~A~n. L. REV.
363; (i9o8) 6 Micir. L. REv. 707; (19o9) 7 ihid. 25,; (292o) 18 ibid. 693;
(i922) i9 ibid. 645; Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 570. In several of these notes more
cautious statements than those of Tiffany are made to the effect that there may be
color of title without a writing. It is argued that something else than a writing
may serve notice on the grantor as to the extent of land claimed by the adverse
possessor.
In Wills v. Wood, L. & M. Ca. (1925) 29 Calif. App. 97, 254 Pac. 613, it was
said that a married woman living with her husband and having no claim in her
own right to land, cannot acquire title to it by adverse possession. Possession
taken by husband and wife where there is color of title in the wife, would be
sufficient for the acquisition of separate property by the wife by adverse posses-
sion. See Madden v. Hall (913) 22 Calif. App. 541, 132 Pac. 291, and cases there
cited. One case cited from Connecticut [Clark v. Gilbert (2872) 39 Conn. 94]
seems to have so held where there was an oral gift to the wife. Color of title,
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any interest which could be protected against ejectment. There is no
difference-in that respect between entering under a parol gift and a
hostile entering sains consent. The point here sought to be made is that
title is not initiated by a parol gift though that is followed by the taking
of possession, inasmuch as there is nothing to prevent the donor from
recalling the gift save the statute of limitations. Therefore the title
accrues solely by virtue of the running of the statute. An onerous,
therefore, rather than a lucrative title is acquired. Perhaps there is a
feeling on the part of the court that a parol gift followed by possession
amounts to livery of seisin. This case is contrary to the view that
otherwise prevails in California that no title accrues by adverse posses-
sion until the statute has run. It is arguable here, however, that the
fact that the husband made no claim of an interest in the premises, is
evidence of an agreement or understanding between the spouses that the
land should become the separate property of the wife, 'or that while he
claimed adversely to the donor, he did not claim as against his wife.
In Pancoast v. Pancoast,30 the husband at the time of marriage was
in adverse possession of certain land. After marriage he came to an
agreement with the true owners whereby he surrendered a .portion of
the occupied premises in consideration of a conveyance to him by the
owner of the part retained. This land was held to be community. In
Johnson v. Johnson,"1 before his marriage one Johnson was in posses-
sion of certain lots under an unsealed instrument purporting to convey
to himself a mule, a dray, and an "interest in the possession of the lots."
After marriage he purchased the lots with community funds. He con-
tended, in an action by his divorced wife for partition of the lots, that
he was already in possession at the time of marriage under a defective
title and that he merely purchased an adverse claim which constituted a
cloud on his title. It was held that he had no title prior to marriage. It
is quite evident that the purported conveyance under which he claimed
was wholly insufficienl to create color of title or to be protected in equity,
from the true owner. 32
however, requires a written instrument See 2 Reeves, Real Property (19o9)
136o; 3 Washburn, Real Property (6th ed. 19o2) sec. 18i. In Smith's Adzr's.
v. De la Garza (1855) 15 Tex. i5o, parties claimed title by adverse possession, the
right originating in the wife as an heir of the first possessor. Cf. McGuire v. De
Fremery (1888) 76 Calif. 401, 18 Pac. 410.
(1881) 57 Calif. 320.
' (1858) 1I Calif. 2oo.
'The Civil Code of California provides that the owner of land in the adverse
possession of another may mortgage it (sec. 2921) and convey it with the same
effect as if he were in actual possession (sec. lO47). The Commissioners' note
on this section reads: "The reason of the ancient common-law doctrine does not
exist here. When livery of seisin was necessary, as it could only be made by the
person in possession, it followed as a matter of course that a conveyance by a
person out of possession was void. In this state the executkn and delivery of a
deed without livery of seisin or entry consumates a conveyance, and therefore*
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IMPROVEMENTS*
Improvements on land may be made under the following circum-
stances:
I. Community funds may be used to improve the separate property
(a) of the husband, or (b) of the wife.
33
2. Separate funds (a) of the wife or (b) of the husband may be
used to improve community property.34
3. Separate funds (a) of the wife may be used to improve the
separate property of the husband and conversely, (b) separate funds of
the husband may be used to improve the separate property of the
wife.3"
there is no good reason why the conveyance of land to which the grantor has a
rightful claim should not be valid."
In Coe v. Sloan (19o9) 16 Idaho, 49, OO Pac. 354, it was held that where the
wife on the death of the husband, being the owner of but one-half, purports to
convey by deed the entire community interest in the land, her conveyance passes her
one-half interest and the purchaser acquires color of title to the interest which
passed by descent to the children of deceased. Cf. Cox v. Tompkinson (195o) 39
Wash. 70, 8o Pac. OO5; Schlarb v. Castaing (1908) 5o Wash. 331, 97 Pac. 289.
* The term improvements is used and not fixtures. The problem of trade
fixtures does not seem to be involved at all.
' (a) Peck v. Brumnnagit (1866) 31 Calif. 44o; Carlson v. Carlson (19o9) IO
Calif. App. 30o, ioI Pac. 923; Shaw v. Berwl (1912) 163 Calif. 262, 124 Pac.
12; Larson v. Carter (i9o8) 14 Idaho, 511, 94 Pac. 825; Beneke v. Beneke
(19o7) 47 Wash. 178, 91 Pac. 641; Succession of Burke (19o2) 1O7 La. 82, 31 So.
391; Schwartazan v. Cabell (1898, Tex. Civ. App.) 49 S. W. 113; Collins v.
Bryan (9o5) 4o Tex. Civ. App. 88, 88 S. W. 432; Brady v. Maddox (igio, Tex.
Civ. App.) 124 S. W. 739; Rudasill v. Rudasill (192o, Tex. Civ. App.) 219 S. W.
843; Barber v. Barber (192o, Tex. Civ. App.) 223 S. W. 866; Stoppelberg v.
Stoppelberg (1920, Tex. Civ. App.) 222 S. W. 587; Potter v. SMith (192o, Calif.
App.) 191 Pac. lO23; Furrh v. Winston (1886) 66 Tex. 521, I S. W. 527;
Succession of Bellande (1899) 41 La. Ann. 491, 6 So. 5o5; NVeaves v. Griffin
(19o4, Tex. Civ. App.) 8o S. W. 42o; Watkins v. Watktns (19o9, Tex. Civ. App.)
119 S. W. 145; King v. Summerville (19o4, Tex. Civ. App.) 8o S. W. 1O5O;
Bullock v. Sprowls, supra note 27; Darden v. Taylor (igio, Tex. Civ. App.) 126
S. W. 944
(b) Succession of Webre (1897) 49 La. 1491, 22 So. 390; Sims v. Billington
(1898) 5o La. 968, 24 So. 637; Gilroy v, Richards (1901) 26 Tex. Civ. App. 355,
63 S. W. 664; Hillen v. Williams (19O1) 25 Tex. Civ. App. 268, 6o S. W. 997;
Robinson v. Moore (1892, Tex. Civ. App.) 20 S. W. 994; Cervantes v. Cervantes
(igo3, Tex. Civ. App.) 76 S. W. 790; Branch v. Makeig (1895) 9 Tex. Civ. App.
399, 28 S. W. 1050; Stoppelberg v. Stoppelberg, supra; Rice v. Rice (1858) 20
Tex. 58; Legg v. Legg (1904) 34 Wash. 132, 75 Pac. 130; Succession of Casey
(1912) 13o La. 743, 58 So. 556; King v. Sumwerville, supra; Lonibardi v.
Lombardi (1921, Nev.) 195 Pac. 93.
" (a) Burns v. Parker (1911, Tex. Civ. App.) 137 S. W. 705; (b) Munchow v.
Munchow (115) 136 La. 753, 67 So. 81g.
' (a) Tison v. Gass (i9o7) 46 Tex. Civ. App. 163, 102 S. W. 751; Parrish v.
Williams (1899, Tex. Civ. App.) 53 S. W. 79; (b) Maddox. v. Suinmerlin (1899)
92 Tex. 484, 49 S. W. 1033, 50 S. W. 567; Schmidt v. Huppman (1889) 73 Tex.
I16, i1 S. W. 175; Smnith v. S11ith (1920, Calif. App.) 191 Pac. 6o.
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4. Community funds of the second community may 'be used to
improve the property of the first community.38
There seems to be no distinction between the use of community and of
separate funds to improve the separate estate of the husband save that if
the funds used are community, only one-half is recoverable, but in either
case a lien is created in favor of the wife and her heirs against the
property so improved.3 7  Likewise where the wife's separate funds are
employed by the husband to improve community property, a lien is
created in her favor. 38  Where, however, the wife's separate property
is improved by the husband by the use of his own or of community
funds, the general rule is that no lien isj created so as to affect the title.39
In the California cases, where the wife's property is so improved, it is
generally held that a gift to the wife is to be presumed so that neither
a lien nor a claim for reimbursement would arise unless by evidence it
were shown that there was no intention to make her a gift.4 The
Texas court holds that there is no presumption of a gift, and that
although no lien arises in his favor he does have a claim for reimburse-
ment or an accounting on dissolution of the community.4 1
The natural conclusion as to the ownership of improvements is that
they follow the land and belong to the owner of it. This is not always
the way in which the matter of ownership has been considered. There
are four views:
i. The improvements follow the land and there is no right of reim-
bursement. 42
2. The improvements follow the land but there is a charge or lien
against the land for the value thereof.43  This is statutory in Louisiana.
"Clift v. Clift (1888) 72 Tex. 144, 1o S. W. 338; Bond v. Hill (1872) 37
Tex. 626; In re Mason's Estate (1917) 95 Wash. 564, 164 Pac. 205.
' See infra note 43.
's See infra note 43.
' See infra note 44.
' Carlson v. Carlson, supra note 33; Snzth v. Smith (Ig2o, Calif. App.) I91
Pac. 6o; Swain v. Duane (1874) 48 Calif. 358; cf. Peck v. Bruminagim (1866)
31 Calif. 440.
4 Collins v. Bryan (i9O5) 4o Tex. Civ. App. 88, 88 S. W. 432; Rudasill v.
Rudasill (192o, Tex. Civ. App.) 219 S. W. 843.
'Swain v. Duarne, supra note 40; Smith v. Sminth, supra note 40; Potter v.
Smith (92o, Calif. App.) 191 Pac. 1O23; Peck v. Brnzagim, supra note 33;
In re Mason's Estate (1917) 95 Wash. 564, 164 PaC. 205; Smith v. Smith (1859)
12 Calif. 216; Shaw v. Bernal, supra note 33; Larson v. Carter, supra note 33.
' Sims v. Billington, supra note 33; Dillon v. Preville (1912) 129 La. 1005, 57
So. 316; see Merrick's La. Code, 1912, art. 24o8; Legg v. Legg, supra note 33;
Allen v. Allen (19o8) IOI Tex. 362, 107 S. W. 528; Darden v. Taylor, supra note
33; Tison v. Gass (1907) 46 Tex. Civ. App. 163, 102 S. W. 75,; Robinson v.
Moore, supra note 33; Parrish v. Williams (1899, Tex. Civ. App.) 53 S. W. 79;
Welder v. Lambert (1898) 91 Tex. 510, 44 S. W. 281; Branch v. Makeig, supra
note 33; Furrh v. Winston, supra note 33; Rice v. Rice, supra note 33; Schwartz-
-man v. Cabell, supra note 33; Hillen v. Williams, sora note 33. The Spanish
Law permitted a lien, Rudasill v. Rudasill, supra note 41.
ACQUISITION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
3. The improvements follow the land. There is no charge or lien
against the land but there is or may be a personal liability on the part
of the owner to reimburse for them."
4. The improvements do not follow the land, but retain the character
of the funds employed in their construction.
45
The difference between the first, second, and third views on the one
hand and the fourth on the other cannot be accounted for by assuming
that in the latter case the improvements are trade fixtures because trade
fixtures are not alluded to at all.
The first view is largely confined to cases where the wife's separate
property has been improved and the rule is that such improvements
are regarded as a gift in the absence of evidence to show that no gift
was intended,4 6 though Texas courts hold differently 47  The improve-
ments "have no operation on the direction of the title" ;48 or, "the
husband cannot assert his claim in any way, so as to incumber or affect
the title of the wife. ' 49  In Washington it is held that the right of
reimbursement is statutory and where there is no statute as in Wash-
ington, there can be no recovery.50
There is a charge or lien where the community funds or the wife's
separate funds are used to improve the husband's land. The Texas
court in Barber v. Barber,51 declared that this was the Spanish law,
though in another case 52 it was said that a right of reimbursement arose
but there was no claim to the property itself. A charge, however, was
allowed.
" Carlson v. Carlson, supra note 40; In re Deschamp's Estate (1914) 77 Wash.
514, 137 Pac. ioog; Brady v. Madox (I9IO, Tex. Civ. App.) 124 S. W. 739;
Schmidt v. Huppman (1889) 73 Tex. 116, 1I S. W. 175; Rudaill v. Rudasill,
supra note 41; Barber v. Barber (192o, Tex. Civ. App.) 223 S. W. 866; Bond v.
Hill (1872) 37 Tex. 626; Munchow v. Munchow, supra note 34; cf. Watkins v.
Watkins, supra note 33. In Fay v. Ray (1913)) 165 Calif. 469, 132 Pac. iO4O, the
wife had conveyed a one-half interest in certain two lots, her separate property,
being induced so to do by the fraudulent representations of the husband. They
were improved partly with community and partly with his separate funds. In an
action by the wife to set aside the conveyance and for reconveyance, the relief
sought was granted, conditioned on the repayment by the wife of the separate and
one-half the community funds so expended. Cf. Succession of Webre (1897) 49
La. Ann. 1491, 22 So. 39o; Bullocks v. Sprowls (1899, Tex. Civ. App.) 54 S. W.
657.
"'Maddox v. Sinmerlin (1899) 92 Tex. 484, 49 S. W. 1033, 50 S. W. 567;
Collins v. Bryan, supra note 41; Neaves v. GrffiUn (19o4, Tex. Civ. App.) 8o
S. W. 42o; King v. Summerville (1904, Tex. Civ. App.) 8o S. W. 050.
" Smith v. Smith, sapra note 42; see notes ih 14 Ann. Cas. 1178 and Ann.' Cas.
1912 A, 1194.
"Collins v. Bryan, supra note 41.
"Carlson v. Carlson, supra note 33.
"Schmidt v. Huppinan, supra note 35.
In re Mason!s Estate, supra note 42.
"Supra note 44.
SWelder v. Lambert, supra note 43; cf. Rice v. Rice, supra note 33.
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The doctrine that no charge arises against the land improved but that
there may be a personal obligation prevails almost exclusively in cases
where the wife's separate property has been improved with community
or with the husband's separate funds. This is probably because the
husband is the manager of the community estate and in Texas par-
ticularly he has control also of the wife's estate.
The fourth view prevails only in Texas. It seems wrong from every
point of view. The improvements are fixtures and should go with the
land to .which they are affixed. Maddox v. Summerlin55 and Collins v.
Bryan54 were cases where community property had been used by the
husband to improve the wife's land and the husband's creditors were
allowed to resort to the improvements though it was expressly stated
that her title to the land could not be affected. In the latter case the
trustee of the estate of the bankrupt husband brought an action to
subject such improvements to the claims of creditors. It was found
that three hundred dollars had been so expended and there was no
showing of fraud. It was held that these improvements constituted
community interests and should be placed in the bankrupt's property
schedules and sold; and that the costs should be taxed to the wife's
interest in the improvements. This amounts to a holding that creditors
can demand an accounting between husband and wife55 which is in
conflict with the great weight of Texas authority unless it be thought
that holding that the improvements continue to be community property
avoids that difficulty.
In general, where there is a lien on the land for the value of the
improvements, the land is community or belongs to the husband and
the lien is in favor of the wife; where there is a mere personal claim
for reimbursement, community or the husband's funds have been used
to improve the wife's land ;, and where the improvements continue
community, they are on the wife's land, and to hold that they are
community and may be sold provides means for payment of the
husband's debts. In one case5 6 where the wife expended community
funds, in improving her separate lot while acting as administratrix on
the death of her husband; it was held that there was no devastavit so
long as she retained the lot but there was a devastavit when she sold it.
In Clift v. Clift,5 7 the husband, after the death of the first wife,
became tenant by the curtesy of her separate land and was in possession
of the community land as co-tenant with the children. With community
funds of the second community he erected permanent improvements,
consisting of a building on the separate land, which building extended
"SSupra note 45.
5, Supra note 41.
'Blim v. Rogers (1889) 71 Tex. 668, 9 S. W. 595; Rudasill v. Rudasill, supra
note 41.
' Neaves v. Grifflh, supra note 45.
"Supra note 36.
ACQUISITION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
over upon the community land. It was held that the second community
could not recover for the funds so expended on the separate land
because improvements erected by a life-tenant are a gratuity to the
remainderman but that where land held in co-tenancy is so improved
there may be a recovery. A recovery was allowed however in Bond v.
Hill,"' where the surviving widow, occupying a homestead as life tenant,
married again and the second husband improved the homestead. It has
been held that one co-tenant cannot recover against the other for
improvements made, apart from the statutory provision to that effect,
but the Texas courts hold the other way.5 9
The question as to the measurement of the amount of the reimburs-
ment has been dealt with by the courts and is statutory in Louisiana.60
In that state the enhanced value of the improved land is the measure' 1
and not the cost of the improvements, and the obligation to reimburse
is treated as quasi-contractual. There are statements in Texas cases to
the effect both that the amount of reimbursement 2 is the enhanced value,
and on the other hand that it is the cost of the improvements, 63 or the
sum so used. Which measure should be adopted should depend on the
circumstances at the time the improvements were made.
Interest was allowed on community funds used to improve the
husband's separate estate in Washington, from the time of the applica-
tion thereof, there being no children and the surviving wife being the
sole heir of the community.' The theory must be that at the time of
the application of the funds, they-were potentially the property of the
wife as she was destined to become the sole owner of the community
property, the profits of separate property being separate there. In
Texas where the rents, issues, and profits of separate property of the
wife were until recently a part of the community estate, interest was
not allowed until the death of the husband though the funds used were
the separate funds of the wife, and were used to improve the husband's
separate land. A recovery of one-half the principal sum expended was
allowed."5
8SUPra note 44.
'Ii re Mason's Estate, supra note 36; Robhson v. Moore, supra note 43;
Burns v. Parker, supra note 34; Clift v. Clift, supra note 36.
Merrick's La. Code, 1912, art. 24o8.
=Sims v. Billington, supra note 33.
Gilroy v. Richards, smtpra note 33; Branch v. Makeig, supra note 33; Burts v.
Parker, supra note 34; Hillen v. Williams, supra note 33; Bond v. Hill, supra
note 44.
' Tison v. Gass, supra note 43; Robinson v. Moore, supra note 33; Cervantes v.
Cervantes (1903, Tex. Civ. App.) 76 S. W. 790; Barber v. Barber, supra note 44;
Furrh v. Witston, supra note 33. This is ihe measure in Washington. Legg v.
Legg, supra note 33. It is observable that in the main where there is a personal
liability but no lien, it is for the amount of the enhanced value, fiut where there is
a lien it is generally for the amount of funds expended.
"' Legg 'v. Legg, supra note 33. See note in 86 Am. Dec. 628.
' Parrish v. Williams, supra note 43.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
CONCLUSION
In conclusion it is suggested that mere adverse possession cannot as
a modern doctrine be said to initiate any title to property as against
the true owner. As against others it may of course be sufficient to
sustain an action of ejectment or trespass. Color of title is not defec-
tive title. It is rather no title at all, for if some title, though defec-
tive, is thus acquired, it is more than color of title. It has significance of
course, mainly where the problem is one of constructive possession and
is said to give notice of the extent of the claim. Possibly we may
say, where there is color pf title in one of the spouses, that con-
structive notice is given of who the claimant is, but that would not
be binding upon the spouses nor upon the creditors of either. The
general rule in common-law states is that the wife may during cover-
ture acquire separate property by adverse possession where she has
color of title. It may also be true that where the spouses enter upon
and adversely occupy land under color of title in one of them, that fact
may be evidence of an understanding inter sese or of their intention
that, when the statute of limitations has run, the acquisition shall be
separate. Possession, however, under a parol gift to one of them can
surely have no such effect.
The ownership of improvements should follow the land to which
they are affixed. There is nothing in the community system that
should change the ordinary rule for fixtures. It is purely a question
of policy depending upon the circumstances whether or not a charge
should be declared against the lands so improved. Since the husband
is the managing agent it may well be that he should be held to a stricter
accountability than the wife. In any event, where no gift was intended,
there should be at least a quasi-contractual liability on the owner of the
land for the enhancement in value.
